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Relative Earnings and Manpower Aliocation
in Developin9 Eumomies
Lloyd G. Reynolds ..

I.

Introduction

The less developed countries present two kinds of challenge to economists.

First,

they invite us to develop hypotheses about how economic growth begins and about struc- ·
tural changes during the early decades of growth.

Second, they provide a fresh terrain on

which functional specialists in public finance, industrial economies, or what not cu.n test
accepted notions about economic behavior.
For investigations in labor economics, the structure of earnings provides a convenient
starting point.

(It is best to say "earnings" rather than "wages" because most workers in

the LDC's are self-employed.) Analysis of earnings requires an examination of manpower
supplies and requirements.

This leads into the economics of agriculture, industry. govern

ment, and other labor-demanding sectors on one side, and into a study of educ2ti<?:1 and
other skill-producing agencies on the other.

Thus by starting with the earni._;1gs structure,

one is led rather directly into the heart of the economy.
Some readjustment of ideas is necessary at the outset in view of basic differences
between the LDC's and the advanced industrial countries.

Certain wage issues which are

important in Europe and the United Stat~s do not bulk large in the present context.

Cost

push pressure on the price level, and the problem of reconciling high employment with price
stability, are not major issues.

The concept of income distribution as a division between

profits and wages is applicable only witpin the small sector of "modem industry." The
concept of a general wage level, with the implication that particular wages move in a
synchronized way, is not useful.

The interesting problems concern rela_tive earnings in

-2:1f:201ent c,reas. ~;;ectors, fi:.:r:<: _ ~:.n occupations, i.e., they are problems in micro-economies.

A serious difficulty is that there is no such thing as a "typical" less developed
country.

The range of variatior1 is much wider than in the North Atlantic world.

Consider

the differences between Malawi and Mexico in income level, composition of output, skill
distribution of labor force
tions.

1

weight of government in the economy, wage-determining institu -

In most respects the countries of tropical Africa cluster toward a "least developed"

pole, some of the Latin American countries toward a relatively advanced pole, with other
LDC• s somewhere in between.
Admitting this difficulty, let us examine a fictitious or

11

median 11 LDC with the

following characteri sties;
First, it is a "mixed economy." Government operates public utility industries and
perhaps
certain
branches
of- manufacturing
in addition to producing
public services.
.
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Second, the economy is at an early stage of development, with "modern" busir.ess
enterprises producing perhaps ten percent of national output.

It is neither Malawi nor

Mexico, but more nearly like Thailand, Pakistan, or Colombia.
Third, the economy is growing. i.e. per capita output is rising.

In a stagnant

economy, the phenomena analyzed below would not appear.
Fourth, population and labor force are growing rapidly--say, at 2. 5 to 3. 0 percent per
year.

There is surplus labor, or perhaps better "labor slack" in the economy, consis'ting

partly in unutilized labor time and partly in wide sectoral differences in output per worker.
There is an ample supply of {untrained) labor to the growth points of the economy.
The occupational groups to be analyzed are:

self-employed workers in agriculture;

self-employed workers in traditional urban occupations; low-skilled workers in "modern"
private enterprises and in government; and white-collar\vorkers requiring some period of

-3formal education. We shall examine how the eei.rn.ings of these workers are determined at a
point of time, and offer hypotheses about the probable movement of relative earnings during
the first few decades of developmen t.

The discussion is necessarily speculative and hypo

thetical, because reliable earnings data are rare in the less developed world, and are
usually limited to short periods of time.

n.

Earnings in Agriculture

Vve begin with agricultural workers, whose earnings are often regarded as constitut
ing a base for the urban earnings structure.

Agriculture is a diversified industry, including

many products and numerous forms of production organizatio n.

It may include large planta

tions, producing for export and hiring wage labor. It includes landless laborers on other
farms, hired on a daily or weekly basis.
land they cultivate.

It includes peasant farmers, who own or rent the

So we must first decide whose incomes we are talking about and what

kind of agricultural organizatio n we are assuming.
iNe limit the discussion to peasant farmers, who may be either owners or tenants. We
assume that all farm work is performed by household members, and ignore the possibility
of hired labor. vVe assume also a clear separation of people and incomes between country
and city. People who move to ths city settle there permanently .

There are no infonnal

income transfers--f arm people do not ship food to relatives in town, nor do town dwellers
help to support rural relatives. This is meant to exclude the African migratory labor situa
tion, in which it becomes difficult to segregate and compare "rur.al incomes" with "urban
incomes.

11

It is necessary next to select an appropriate income measure.

Should this be earn

ings per man-hour of labor, or per farm worker, or per farm household? All adult household
members commonly do some work on the farm, and children begin to contribute at an early

-4FcHm employment Js thus difficult to measure, and it is probably be st to take income

age,

per household as the most useful figure.

At an early stage of development, farm income consists largely of production for home
use.

This is not merely food production, but includes almost everything the family con

sumes--clothing, housing, furniture, personal services.

Salt, tea, shoes or sandals,

cloth, and a few metal tools and cooking utensils may be the only purchased items.
valuation of household production is thus of critical importance.

The

In GNP calculations,

foodstuffs for home consumption are usually valued at farm prices, so as not to include
"fictitious" transport and marketing charges.

But if the purpose is rural--urban welfare

comparisons, or appraisal of inducements to migration, it would seem that farm production
should be valued at "city prices." To the extent that this is not done, and to the extent
. that a.11 items of hous.ehold production are not counted, the relative level of rural earnings
is understated.
Where the peasant is an owner-cultivator, there should be a deduction for imputed
-rent and interest in order to arrive at labor income proper.

But such adjustments are

notoriously imprecise and often yield the result 1hat farm labor income is very low or even
negative.

In any event, gr0 ss earnings including rent and interest may be more pertinent

to analysis of rural-urban migtation and labor supply to the modern sector.

Having made these distinctions, what can one say about the probable behavior of
peasant incomes?

These incomes are certainly"low" though perhaps not as low as may

appear, because of a bias toward undervaluation of household output in existing measure
ments.

It is not certain either that real incomes of rural households are below those of

urban· households engaged in "traditional" trade, service, and handicraft activities.
More interesting, however, is the question of m1=)Vement over time.
that per capita output ir. the economy is rising.

We have assumed

It would seem, then, that per capita

-5agricultural output must also be ri~~in9 tn the economy is not to run into the Rica.rdian food
bottleneck.

Vvhile there are some possible lines of escape from this proposition, none

appears very promising.

First, a strong government might follow an austerity program

under which per capita consumption does not rise despite a continuing increase in par
capita output, which would then be channeled entirely into capital formation.

It is doubt

ful, however, that many governments in the less developed world could actually enforce
such a program.

Second, domestic food production per capita might be increased without

any increase in agricultural output per capita by diversion of acreage from export crops and
. non-food crops.
period.

But this does not look like a viable development path over any extended

Third, if the country is able to increase non-agricultural exports rapidly, it can

import food to close a growing agricultural deficit.

But this would be feasible for only a

few oil or mineral exporters.
One could argue, indeed, that farm income per household must rise in any event.
For suppose that agricultural output rises only as fast as population, or even at some lower

rate.

Rising per capita incomes in other sectors, pressing against this limited food supply,

will shift the rural-urban terms of trade in favor of agriculture.
household will then rise because of the terms of trade effect.

Real income per farm
It is unwise to rely on this

as more than a short-term argument, however, because sue~ a growth path would come to
an end rather quickly as the classical economists foresaw.
In the general case of successful development along a balanced agricultural
industrial path, agricultural output per head of national population will be rising. Assum'ing for the moment that the distribution of population between agriculture and non
agriculture remains unchanged, agricultural output per head of farm population will be
rising.

(If there is a redistribution of population toward urban areas, as is sometimes

assumed in growth models, -the argument holds a fortiori.)

-6-

If output and income per farm howsehold are rising, it seems likely that consumption
per household will also be rising.

All of the increased income (in the case of owner

cultivatorsL or a certain proportion of it (in the case oi tenants), accrues to the farmer in
the first instance.
part of it.

Wr.ile he may save some of the increment, he will normally consume

Government may recapture part of the increase through taxation; but a 100 per

cent marginal rate of taxation is scarcely feasible.

Increased output requires that the

household supply increased labor inputs, learn new techniques, and assume new risks.
It seems unlikely that they would be willing to do this for zero return.
V✓ e

conclude that growth models in which the "rural wage rate" remain constant as

output rises are not plausible.

Instead, in come and consumption per household will move

upward over time.
The rate of increase depends on: (1) the rate of increase in physical output, which
depends partly on what government does to discover and disseminate new techniques, and
to make available physical inputs, credit, a·nd marketing facilities; (2) land tenure arrange
ments, which det~ermine the share of increments in output accruing to the cultivator, and.
which can be altered by government 11:hrough II land reform II measures; (3) the behavior of ·farm
prices, which is often regulated through price supports, marketing boards, or other govern
ment purchase schemes; (4) the marginal rate of taxation on farm incomes.
nothing inevitable about the rate of increase in agricultural incomes.

There is thus

It is normally regu

lated--more or less systematically, more or less wisely--by what government does or fails

to do.
Do decisions in this sphere affect..only the operation of the agricultural sector, or do
they react alzo on the urban wage level? In models of the Lewis or Fei-Ranis type, there
would be a direct reaction.

The supply curve of labor to the modern sector of the economy

-7is Jra,,,..-n hori zontctl at a

urban migration.

sufiiciently above earnings in agriculture to induce rural-

.

If, then, the level of farm earnings :were to rise, the urban labor supply

curve would shift upward correspondingly.

The wage of low-skilled urban labor would move

upward over time at the same rate as agricultural earnings.
But while things might possibly work in this way, they do not seem actually to work
in this way.

It seems in fact reasonable to draw the supply curve of labor to the modern

sector (SS in Figure 1) as sloping upward in the usual way.

Although we have spoken for

convenience of an average level of earnings in agriculture, actual earnings vary widely
because of variations in soil, climate, water availability, cropping patterns, and the
farmer's own capacity.

The wage at which individuals find it worthwhile to transfer from

country to city will vary correspondingly.
its recruits from agriculture.
entrants to the labor force.

1

Moreover, the modern sector draws only part of

Some come from other urban activities, and some are new
For these people, too, it is reasonable to suppose t:iat the

higher the industrial wage, the larger will be the number of job applicants.
The truth behind the Lewis-type diagrams is that, at the wage-level prevailing in the
modern sector (OW in Figure 1), the number of workers desiring employment (ON) exceeds
the number demanded (OE).

There is a disequilibrium situation.

The interesting question

is how the wage OW was established, and why it does not fall in the face of a labor
surplus.

Explanation of this phenomenon belongs to a later section.

An increase in agricultural earnings would shift the supply-curve leftward, say to

s1 , s 1 .

But this would still leave a labor surplus, and would not directly affect wages

or employment in the modem sector.
1 In a sample of 1000 new factory workers in Puerto Rico, the writer found that about one
fifth had tre.nsferred from agriculture, two-fifths were drawn from other sectors of the
economy, and another two-fifths were r1ew entrants to the labor force. See Lloyd G.
Reynolds and Peter Gregory, \IVages, Productivity, and Industrialization in Puerto _Ric:q_
(Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965). p. 209. It would be useful to have compar
able evidence from other industrializing countries.
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The Low-Productivity Urban Sector

Simplified models of development sometimes assume that all non-agriculturalists are
employed in the modern sector 1.

But this is actually not true.

prises two distinct areas of employment.

The urban population com

These may be termed the traditional and modern

areas, or the small enterprise and large enterprise areas, or the low productivity and high
productivity areas.
In the early stages of development, most of the urban labor force is in the low pro
ductivity area.

This includes handicraft manufacturing, retailing, labor-intensive transport

of goods and people, domestic and personal service, and a variety of other service activi
ties.

Most of these people are self-employed, resembling in this respect the agricultural

population.

Entrance to the occupations in question is open.

no skill, and also little or no capital.

Most of them require little or

They thus provide a natural entry point for migrants

from the country, who win a precarious foothold in the urban economy by crowding into
petty trade, services, and other small-scale activities.
contributes to low output and income per worker.

Overmanning of these activities

While most people manage to work a

little and earn a little, some remain wholly unemployed.

They presumably subsist by being

attached to a household which has some source of income; but their presence reduces real
income per household member. ·
Very little is known about incomes in this sector.

Statistical effort tends to be con

centrated or. wages and salaries in the modern sector, and to a lesser extent on agricultural
earnings.

Even if one had good measures of money inco01e, it would be difficult to compare

real income levels in city and country.
1

There are well-known pitfalls in such comparisons,

The original Lewis article, however, was careful not to make this assumption. Lewis
includes among his sources of surplus labor what we here term the low-productivity urban
sector.

-10-

,r,cJuding the fact that soirw Hems consumed in the city are not available in the country.
One is in the end comparing two different styles of life •.
Suppose, however, that these difficulties could be overcome.

What would one

expect to be the relation, in equilibrium , between real earnings in agriculture and· in
traditional urban activities?

The equilibratin g factor would be rural-urban migration.

the question may be put in this form:

So

what assumption s about migration would lead one t:>

expect income parity between agricultura l and (traditional) urban occupation s?
One would have to assume that everyone growing up in the countryside has the option
of remaining in agriculture (no one is literally pushed out by land scarcity); that the only
alternative to agricultural employment is employmen t in the low-produc tivity urban sector
(wh~ch ignores the chance to secure employment in the high-wage modern sector); that
differences in real household income are the only determinant of migration {the "bright
lights" and other presumed attractions of city life are not relevant); that whole households
migrate; that accurate information is available, and that migration costs are zer,o.

Under

these conditions one might expect real incomes to tend toward the same level _in both
sectors.. Any disruption of equilibrium resulting from differing rates of population growth in
country and city, or from differing rates of increase in labor demand, would be speedily
corrected by net migration.
Migration is clearly more complex ~han this, and we do not know much about it.
Labor market information is poor, and the costs and risks of migration are substantial .

On

these counts it is often argued that the equilibrium level of real income will be somewl:at
higher in the city.

But there are also forces working in the opposite direction.
.••

If rural

population growth is rapid and land scarce, people may be forced out of agriculture willy
nilly.

City life also has considerabl e non-moneta ry attractions:

enlarged opportuniti es

-11for socia l cont act, inclu ding

d

broc:,c!er marri age mark et for youn g peop le; great er varie
ty of

recre ation al oppo rtuni ties; the poss ibilit y of learn ing
new skill s and movi ng up the econ 
omic ladde r; bette r educ ation al oppo rtuni ties for one I
s child ren.

More over, there is in the

city a mode m high-wagE> secto r along side the tradi
tiona l secto r.

The actua rial likel ihood

of getti ng empl oyme nt in this secto r has a value whic
h must be adde d to the other attra c
tions of city life.
avera ge educ ation .

This cons idera tion is espe ciall y impo rtant for youn
g peop le with abov e
Much of the coun try-c ity migr ation cons ists of such
peop le rathe r than

of whol e fami lies.
One can readi ly argu e, then, that the equil ibriu m level
of real incom e in tradi tiona l
urban activ ities may be below that in agric ultur e.

Or to put the point diffe rentl y, incom e

parit y in the two secto rs will lead to subs tanti al coun
try-c ity migr ation .

This hypo these s

·can be teste d, howe ver, only throu gh coun try-b y-co
untry inves tigat ion.
V\/ha tever the equil ibriu m incom e relat ion may be--a
nd supp osing that equil ibriu m is
once estab lishe d--ch ange s in the earni ngs level in
tradi tiona l urban activ ities shou ld
thenc efort h paral lel those in agric ultur e.

If real incom e per farm hous ehold rises grad ually

over time, as we argue d earli er it shou ld do in a grow
ing econ omy, one woul d expe ct a
· simil ar move ment of earni ngs in tradi tiona l urban
activ ities .
A word may be adde d on urban unem ploym ent.

-,

In many .of the less deve loped

coun tries~ the numb er of rural -urba n migr ates has recen
tly exce eded the incre ase in urban
labor dema nd, leadi ng to grow ing unem ploym ent and
unde remp loym ent in the citie s. Whil e
this is indee d a serio us probl em, one may spec ulate
that unem ploym ent will not incre ase
indef inite ly.

It tends to reduc e real incol l)e per hous ehold mem ber
in the citie s relat ive to

-12-

1
ihat in agriculture; an:J. it reduces the probability of new migrants being able to find jobs in
the modern sector.

Both effects are unfavorable to migration.

At some level of unemploy-

ment, therefore, net migration will fall to the rate at which new urban jobs are being
created.

Unemployment will then have reached an equilibrium level, and will not increase

further.
There are important policy problems in this area.

Assuming that many LDC's will

have substantial under-employm ent for some decades to come, is it better for people to be
under-employe d in the country or the city?

Should cityward migration be encouraged or

discouraged? Vvhat policy instruments are available?

Further investigation of migration

behavior and relative income levels might contribute to resolving such questions.
IV.

The Modern Sector:

Low-Skilled Labor

The modern (or high-productiv ity) sector embraces government service, factory
industry, commercial construction, mechanized transportation, import and export trade,
banking and finance, electric power and other public utilities.

In some economies it

includes also large mining or petroleum industries.
The wage rate of primary concern is the hiring rate for unskilled labor; but we use the
broader term "low-skilled labor" to include semi-skilled operatives in manufacturing and
comparable groups in other industries.

These jobs require only a short training period, and

are usually paid at not much more than unskilled labor rate.
1

Calculation of this probability requires assumptions about the working of the urban labor
market. One might assume, for example, that new migrants take their place at the tail of
a queue and are hired only after the existing unemployed have been absorbed. Alternatively,
it could be assumed that a new migrant has P,recisely the .same chance of employment this
month as do the existing unemployed, i.e., that selection by employers is random as
regards date of migration. Under either assumption, a higher level of unemployment will
reduce the prospects of the new migrant.

-13Ths limi.te;cl statistical evidence suggests tvvo observations concerning these rates.
First, they seem to vary considerably more among estaplishments than is true in more
developed countries, suggesting greater imperfection of the labor market (including the
widespread prevalence of underemployment and surplus labor).

This variation is observ

able, for example in data on wage rates by size of manufacturing establishment.

It is

normal everywhere for smaller enterprises to pay less than larger ones; but in the more
developed countries the differential is moderate.

Taira found that in the U.S., Britain,

and five West European countries, manufacturing plants with 50-99 employees typically
paid 80-90 percent as much as establishments with 1,000 employees and over,

But the

smaller enterprises pay only 55 percent as much in India and 65 percent as much in the
United Arab Republic. 1
The second striking fact is that:·wage levels in the modern sector seem very high
relative to earnings in traditional activities.

Instead of the modest 30 or 40 percent

premium hypothesized in some growth models, they are often 2 to 3 times as high •. Foreign
owned oil and mineral companies seem particularly prone to pay wages much above tradi
tional levels.

Evidence is available from areas as diverse as Jamaica, Puerto Rico,
2

Zambia, Uganda, Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran..

While more evidence is needed, it is a

1

Koji Taira, "Wage differentials in developj.ng countries: a survey of findings. "
International Labour Review, March 196Ei, pp. 281-301. _ The data for most countries are
from the era 1955-60. In some countries, though not all, they represent comparison of
different enterprises in the same industry, which is of course much to be desired.
2

In addition to Taira and Reynolds and Gregory, see Elliott J. Berg, "Major Issues of Wage
. Policy in Africa," - Arthur M. Ross (ed.), Industrial Relations and Economic Developme_nt
(London: Macmillan, 1966); Elliott J. Berg, "Wage Structure in Less-Developed Countries, 11
forthcoming in a symposium volume on VVage Policy Issues in Economic Development, to be
published for the International Institute for Labor Studies; and J. B. Knight, The determina
tion of wages and salaries in Uganda, in Bulletin of the Oxford Institu~e of Economics and
Statistics, Vol. 29, No. 3, 1967.
11

11

'

.
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plausible hypothes is that industria l employer s throughou t the less developed world
typically pay more than the supply price of low-skilJ. ed labor, i.e .• that the labor market
situation is as sketched in Figure 1.
vVhy should employer s behave in this way?
First, a high-wag e policy often costs very little.

Th8re are several possible reasons.
In capital-in tensive manufact uring and

extractiv e industrie s, labor cost is a small percentag e of value added.

Moreover , if the

company 's profits are taxed at, say, 50 percent, half of any wage premium is paid by
governme nt.
Second, a high-wag e policy has productiv ity advantag es, and so again costs less
than it .may appear to cost.

It enables the employer to skim the cream of the local labor

forpe, to secure workers of relatively low age, superior physique and intelligen ce,
above-av erage education , stable work habits, good scores on tests of manual aptitude.
It helps to reduce turnover and absentee ism.

It enables superviso rs to demand a good pace

of work plus attention to quality of product and care of machines . Higher wages may also
add to workers' strength and efficienc y by permittin g better nutrition and health care.
Third, there are less tangible but important advantag es in the company 's public
relations .

In the ideologic al atmosphe re of most LDC' s. high profits are viewed with

suspicion and may lead to demands for nationali zation or heavier taxation.

Foreign-o wned"

enterpris es are especiall y vulnerabl e to political attack._ Profit-sha ring through an
obviously generous wage level may seem good long-rang e strategy.
Once a sizeable wage differenti al has appeared , for whatever reasons, it tends to
harden into custom.

There develops , in

~

sense, a dual labor market.

To the extent that

employer s are competin g, not for labor in general, but for workers already accustom ed to
employme nt in the modern sector, they may be expected: to offer what other modern-s ector

-15employers are paying.

This can be rati.onali z.eu partly by arguing that the productivity of

experienced industrial workers is higher than that of new, untrained workers, they contain
more efficiency units per man.

Perhaps more significant, however, is that their wage

expectations are decidedly higher as a result of their past earnings experience.
Wage levels are not deter_!l'lined simply by market pressures and employer policies.
Trade unions are typically not very consequential in the LDC's, operating mainly as
political pressure groups rather than as bargaining organizations.
lation, however, is quite important.
egalitarian.

Government wage regu

In most LDC' s the political climate is welfarist and

The urban employees. including government employees, the university

students, the writers and intellectuals are a force to be reckoned with if a (frequently)
insecure government is to remain in power.

Given the obviously high wage-paying ability

· of modern industry, it is entirely natural for governments to pursue a high-wage policy

(high, that is 1 relative to earnings in traditional activities, though still low on an
absolute basis or relative to more developed countries).
Government policy operates, first, through the wage level it sets for its own
employees.

Government departments and state enterprises employ a considerable share,

often 20 to 40 percent, of the workers in the modern sector.

So it can, and frequently

does, act as a wage leader for this sector.
The other main device is minimum wage legislation, which is widespread in the LDC's
and usually exerts substantial pressure on the wage structure.

Even if the initial minimum

is reasonably in line with traditional earnings, there is a strong tendency toward frequent
. and large increases.

One can always show that existing wages are too low to support a
.•

"decent" standard of life, and it can be argued plausibly that employers will somehow
absorb the higher labor costs.

In Uganda, for example, the minimum wage in government

-16-

employm::rnt was tripled between 1954 and 1964, a period during which the average incomes
of peasant proprietors rose very little.

In Puerto Rico, too, minimum wages in manufactur

ing almost tripled between 1950 and 1963. 1

Increases of 10 percent a year are not uncom

mon in other countries.
The effect of the minimum wage system is thus quite different from its effect in more
developed countries&

In the United States, for example, the federal minimum wage lags

the upward movement of wage rates.

When the minimum is raised ever/ five years or so,

this affects only a few percent of the labor force, and serves mainly to tic.y up the ragged
lower fring~ of the v,age structure.

In the LDC I s ,on the other hand, the minimum actually

determines the earnings of low-skilled labor, and forces them increasingly above the
supply-price of such labor.
Given this kind of split-level wage structure, it seems likely that the earnings gap
between the modern::1 and traditional sectors will vviden over the early decades of develop
ment.

An important consideration here is that value added per worker in the mode:-n, sector

is likely to rise quite rapidly over time--partly through "learning" by both workers and
managers which is normal in new enterprises, partly through other ty!,Jes of tech.Meal
progress.
The fact that output per worker is rising does not per se provide ar..y reason for w2ge
increases, since v,ages a~e already above the supply price of labor.

But if wage rates

were actually held stable, or at least held stable relative to product prices, profit margins
would widen continuously.

This is politically unacceptable for reasons suggested earlier,

· and there will be strong pressure to keep__ wages moving upward.
Earnings in traditional activities will also be rising, because of our basic assumption
of agricultural progress;

but they are likely to be rising quite gradually.

1 See the Knight and Reynolds-Gregcry studies cited previously.

It is thus a
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a reascnable hypcth2sis that the \1,::ge level in the modern sector will diverge forther and
farther above earnings in traditional activities.
A rough test of this hypothesis may be had by comparing the movement of real vvages
in each country with that of real product per capita.

This indic-:ites whether employees are

improving their position relative to the population in general.
factory.

The data are very uns;:1tis

A study by A. D. Smith sugg·ests, however, that in tropical Africa the rate of

wage increase has everywhere outpaced that of GNP increase.

This has also been true

generally in Central and South America, though Brazil and Peru may constitute exceptions.
In Asia, the picture is mixed.

Wages have advanced materially faster than output per

capita in Ceylon, but at about the same rate in Pakistan, and less rapidly in India and the
Philippines.

1

It is interesting to speculate on the main consequences of this kind of wage
behavior.

First, how is continual forcing up of the unskilled labor rate likely to affect the

earnings of higher grades of manual labor? As regards semi-skilled workers, ·there is a
tendency toward compression of skill differentials.

When the minimum wage is raised,

workers who are only a short distance above the minimum usually receive incre2.ses as
well.

But these are often not equal in absolute terms, and still less in percentage terms,

to the increase in the minimum wage.

If, however, the shrinkage of differentials reachGs

the point of inte:.-fering with incentive to learn and perform semi-skilled jobs, the employer
has the o:.:-tion of widening them once more.

These rates are market-determined in that the

premium ov_er the common labor rate must be sufficient to call forth the required supplies.
From another standpoint, since the common labor nate itself is artificial, the structure of
rates above it may also be considered artificial.
1A. D. Smith, "A Conspectus of
Wage Trends in Developing Countries," to b8 published in
the International Institute of Labor Studies symposium previously cited. Duta for most
countries cover the years 1956-64.

-18The wages of skilled manual workers are also market determined, and foeir premium
over unskilled labor is considerably larger than in more developed countries.

In Britain and

Western Europe, skilled men typically earn 20 to 30 p~rcent more than the unskilled.

In the

LDC's, however, they almost invariably 1 earn at least 50 percent more, and quite often earn
.
2
two to three times the laborers' wage.

The movement of skilled rates over time ~epends

mainly on the relative rates of increase in demand and supply.

In a growing economy, with

considerable investment in infrastructure and industry, demand for skilled tradt:smen will
be rising quite rapidly.
ing period.

The response of supply is lagged because of the lei1gth of the train

In some newly-independent countries, where skilled work was formerly done

by expatriates or by ethnic groups regarded as "foreign," nationalization of these jobs may

also restrict supply for the time being.
On balance, skilled rates seem likely to advance rapidly in economies which are
really progressing.

The minimum rate for the unskilled is being pushed up meanwhile by the

non-market pressures noted earlier.

V1/hether the skilled-unskilled differenti.21 widc:ms or

-

narrows over time depends on the arithmetic balance of these two sets of forces, which have
nothing directly to do with each other.

The evidence assembled by Berg su,Jgests ":.h::it there

has been some tendency toward compression of skill differentials in the post-V/orld II period;
1

In Chilean manufacturing, Gregory found that skilled workers earned on averagG O!"l).y 42
percent more than the unskilled in 1963. (Peter Gregory, Industrial Wages in Ghil~, Ithacu:
New York State Schoor·of Labor and Industrial Relations, 1967}, p. 88. Argentina seems
also to have only moderate skill differentials. These two countries, of course, are ::;emi
industrialized and not really typical of LDC's in general.
2see a summary of the available evidence by Berg, in the I. I. L. S. paper previously cited.
As Berg points out, however, it is not ea.sy to identify the rate for a certain cutegory of
· skilled labor. There is usually a wide variety of rates for any job title. One reason is that
the classification itself is heterogeneou~., comprising some people who are truly all-round
craftsmen along with a larger number with less skill and training. The gap between the
laborer and the true crc:ftsmen is considerably wider than is suggested by studies which
use median earnings of all those classified as skilled.

-19but that this tendency is not as strong
expected a priori.

01

as uniform among countries as one might have

Of 13 LDC's for which data were available in the early 'fifties and in

the early 'sixties, skill differentials seemed to have fallen in 8 and risen in 5; but in
several cases the degree of change was too small to be significant in view of the crudeness
of the data.
The fact that the modern sector wage level is abnormally high, in part because of
The

non-market pressures, has other consequences which can be mentioned only briefly.

tendency for the profit share of national income to rise sharply during early development is
retarded, through the transfer of potential profits to wage -earners.

Investment in the

modern sector may be reduced, both by a reduction of reinvestible earnings and of the
profit margins which are the incentive to investment.
Rising wages may have favorable productivity effects. In addition to the possible
effects already noted on workers' physical capacity there is something to the "shock effect"
on management.

New enterprises setting up in a country where manual labor seems very
-

cheap are likely to use it wastefully.
effort to maintain profit margins.

.

Wage pressure forces them to economize labor in an

To the extent that these efforts are successful,· the

impact on industrial profits is reduced; but the negative impact on industrial employment
becomes more severe.
Wage pressure in the modem sector increases the inequality of labor income in the
economy.

It creates a high-wage island in a sea of agriculturalists and self-employed or

unemployed urban workers living at much lower income levels.

This must make it harder

,for government to apply any general policy of restraining consumption for the sake of

investment.

Farmers or others who are squeezed by such a poli.cy can point to the rapid

rise of industrial wages and demand similar :t,reatment.

-20Not unimportant is the squeeze on the government budget.

A rapid rise of wages in

d1e public sector means large built-in increases in the current budget, of which two-thirds

or so is payment for labor services.
Suppose GNP is rising at 5 percent per year, and that the tax system has unit income
elasticity, so that revenues are also rising 5 percent per year.

Then if the government

wage level is also rising S percent per year, it is clear first, that the numbers employed in
providing current government services cannot be increases; and second, that there can be
no increase in the proportion of the budget devoted to investment.

The investment propor

tion can be increased only through some combination of: a tax structure which yields a
revenue elasticity greater than one; frequent imposition of new taxes so that, even if the
elasticity of existing taxes is less than one, revenues will still rise faster than GNP; a
rate of increase in government salary scales below the rate of GNP increase; or a reduction
of current services.
othe.r fronts.

The less the succ'=!sS on the wage front, the greater the pressure on

In some countries wage pressure has contributed to a growing encroachment

of the current budget on the capital budget, contrary to the requirement for successful
development.
This leads to the employment effect of rapid wage increases.

If we assume that the

amount which government can budget for labor services is independent of the wage level,
the elasticity of demand for labor in the public sector is -1.

Elasticity in the modern

business sector is harder to estimate, but must also be negative and substantial.

Wage

pressure leads to efforts to economize labor, both through better management and through
capital-labor substitution.

This is certainly one reason, though not the· only reason, why

manufacturing employment in Puerto Rico rose only 65 percent between 1950 and 1962,

-21u:tho~·-'..;h vc.i..:e adc'.ed in manufacturing increaseJ more than fourfold. 1 A si::1E.::r : : ~c:,.,-

(;!C-,!~;1

of ind'.1strial employment, despite large increases in industrial output, is reported fro!n
I')

many I.DC 1 s .....
A final effect of rapid wage increases in the modern sector is to stimul:t'~e n.:.rz,_l-ud:;2:1
migrctio;;..

The higher the wage level in the modem sector the greater, other tMnJs equnl,

vvill ba th0 volume of migration; and the higher also will be the equilibrium kvel 0£ ~=-b2.:1
UHemplo~{r.,cnt.
'I'~-iese surmises about wage-employment behavior in the modern sector are
in I'ig•1,c:: 2..

The Sl!bscript 1 denotes an initial situation while subscript 2 ind:ci:1t2s th8

situatior,, say, five years later.

Because of the assumption that earnings in .:!Jricu!t;.ire

and o~h3r traditional occupations are rising, the labor supply curve
. level tl-:E'!n

s1 .

le.bar fo:co.

s2

starts out i:'.t a h~~_;t(_,_

But it bends outward to the right because of the growth of populati0~1 2nd

Th3 demand curve for labor is shifting rightward because of exy-::.~1sio:1 i:.:. but~:

the busi!1es.: · and government sectors.
t,)

s~t.,1'.;:::;ri z.cJ

The wage-level is assumed to h-:i.ve s::i:ted u:;·;·.v.Jr:~

Wz for re:isor1s suggested earlier.
:'.:n the new equilibrium, employment in the modern sector has incre:i.sed, b~1'.: bi co::i-·

siC.:.erab~:f less than the rightward shift of demand.
shown Ly the distance Ez N , have also increased.
2

Unemployment and underer:~}-)loyi-:·.-2.1t,
3

This may be a rather ty!-ic21 situa-·

tion for high-population-growth countries during the early decades of develo;n.•ent.
1 Greatzr
detail is presented in Reynolds and Gregory, op. cit., Ch~.1-3. Strictly rr.:i.nu
focturir..g output should be valued in constant dollars. The Puerto Rican pric-3 leve~. rose
moderately frcr.1 1950-62, in line with that of the U.S. mainland. Even on this bc:.~t:,,
however, there would remain a gross discrepancy between output and employr... . cmt·t.-c:ids.
2 See

0!1 tnis point Werner Baer and Michel Herve, II Employment and industric:~izatio:1 in
c.evelo:::-,iw1 countries," Quarterly Tournal of Economics, February 1966, pp. 88-107.

3 Figure 2 does not show directly the number of unemployed. Some of those arrayed done:_:
t:1c dis~·2nc8 Ez N 2 are wholly unemployed; some are partially unemployed who wort: 3. s}:c·,:
'\'.'Gek; n~ost are disguisedly unemplcyed, i.e., working normal hours but producing -:J.nd ec.:-r~-
i~g belc·N wh:it they could earn in "modern" activities. It seems plausible tha.i:, as t;:.;;; C:i..::; tance Ez N2 lengthens, its three components increase more or less proportionc1:2ly. l:3ut
this hypothesis woi.::~a requ1te."fa.d::e-mpirical test.
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V.

ThE' Modern S2ctor:

f,;d1Jcated Labor

Our explorations in this area must necessarily be brief. We consider only white
collar occupations, and we assume that some degree of education is required for unemploy
ment in these occupations.

Initially. we shall assum-3 that there is only one grade ~£

"educated labor," characterized by secondary-scho ol graduation.

We assume also that

educated labor is produced and employed wholly within the country. i.e •• we ignore the
possibility of hiring expatriates, and the reverse possibility of "brain drain" losses to
1 .
more advanced countries.
Figure 3 illustrates wage detennination for the single category of secondary-scho ol
graduates.

The stock of such people is fixed in the short-run at OE.

in conjunction with the fixed supply. determines a wage OW.

The demand curve D,

The potential supply curve,

S, may be presumed to start near the unskilled wage level in the modern sector,
slope upward in the usual way.

2

and to

This curve does not affect the wage level because of the

supply bottleneck imposed by the educational system.

Educated labor earns a rent equal

to the area between the wage line and the supply curve.

Rental incomes are apt to be viewed with suspicion.
were made to eliminate this type of rent?

What would happen if efforts

One might reason that the proper wage is OW 1 ,

at the intersection of the D and S curves, and might try to i.mpose a ceiling at this level.
The· first effect of ~his, however, would be to create excess demand of EE1.

There would

be competition for educated labor among government departments, public enterprises, and

private industry.

Unless workers could be allocated among employers, the wage line

ow· 1

could not be held.
1 The complications arising from expatriate labor are explored in an interesting unpub
11
lished paper by Dharum Ghai, 11 Some Notes on Labour Markets in East Africa (Nairobi:
Institute for Development Studies, University College,. Nairobi 1967 (mimeo)
2 Not£!.. the unskilled level, if decisions are rational, because of foregone income and
educational expenses during the training period.
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-25The basic remedy, clearly, is to increase educational capacity.

But by how much?

Should one aim at a target on ON, which would take care of all those willing to apply for
education at the prevailing wage?

This would overshoot the mark. A supply of ON, in

conjunction with the d(:mand curve D, would in a corr.petitive market cause earning:.; of
educated people to fall substantially, and many of those who had chosen education would
be disappointed.

Or, if the wage OW is rigid downward for institutional reasons, there

would be "educated unemployment" of EN.
Because of the time required to expand educational capacity, such overshooting is
unlikely in practice.

But setting educational targets is clearly a complex problem, and

1
any target which may be selected has wage implications which are not always recognized.
Figure 3 assumes, that at the outset of development., educational facilities are
likely to be so restricted as to produce substantial rents for school graduates.
situation will of course differ from country to country.

The actual

There are indications, however,

that large wage differentials for educated white-collar workers are common in the LDC's.
In Chile in 1960, the monthly earnings of manual workers in manufacturing averaged about
65 escudos, while office workers averaged 163 escudos.

2

'

In Uganda, in 1965, when the

rate for unskilled government employees of whom no education is required was I:.90 per
year, holders of a Junior Leavers' Certificate (8 years of education) were averaging 1:.204
1 The complexities, i~deed, are not fully revealed by Figure 3. Labor quantities such as
OE and ON are stocks at a moment of time. The output of the educational system, however,
is a flow per unit of time. The time needed to raise the stock OE to ON will depend on the
annual outp11t capacity of the educational system and on attrition rates. Since _time is
required, the demand curve (and probably the wage rate) will meanwhile have shifted to a
new P©sition. The problem of educational target-setting. must thus be set up albegraically
with a time dimension.
2 Gregory, op. cit., pp. 37 and 81.' The figures for both groups include wage supplements
as well as basic rates.

.,;

-26per y3ar in the civil seivice, while holders of School Certificctes (12 years of education)

earned an average of 1550 per year.

1

Taira presents data on relative earnings of unskilled

labor and bank tellers in 9 more developed countries and 15 less developed countries.

2

In

the MDC's the ratio of tellers to laborers' earnings in 1963 vr:iried from 0. 8 in New Zealand
to 1. 7 in Australia.

In the LDC' s, hcwever, tellers typically earned 2 to 4 times as much

as laborers, the ratio rising as high as 5. 9 in Chile, 6. 1 in Kenya, 6. 5 in Nigeria, and
6. 9 in Guatemala.

While such large differentials may contain a conventional element, they

seem to be mainly market-determined, with educational supply restrictions playing a key
role.
How will the prer::ium for educated manpower behave over time?
on_ the relative rates of increase in demand and supply.

This clearly depends

Even without expansion of educa

tional facilities, E wiE move rightward if the annual output of graduates exceeds attrition
through death and retirnment.

But the higher the rate of expansion in school capacity, the

more rapidly tl-1e stock of educated manpower will rise.

The rate at which the demand curve

shifts to the right cl2pends on the rate at which output is rising in the modem sector, and
on their inputs of educcted labor per unit of output.

The input coefficient is no doubt

.adjustable, but not indefinitely; and in the public sector custom may enforce educational
q:1 ~alifications for eaci1 civil service grade regardless of job content.

There is a distinct possibility tha~ the differential for educated manpower will widen
for quite some time.

This is especially likely in countries which entered a phase of

acc0lerated growth witl1 a small educational base.
Matters become more complicated ~hen one recognizes that there are several levels
of educated manpower.
1

There are primary graduates, secondary graduates, and university

Knight, op, cit., p. 255

2 T ·
··~-, ,
JAlra, C.

Cl' t .

pp. 288 - 289

-27cJraduates (even overlooking dro;-,ci3ts

dt

j,ifennsdia.te levels.)

The behavior of supply at

these various levels, and the consequent behavior of earnings differentials, will depend
on the strategy of educational expansion.
The c.llocation of secondary school graduates is particularly crucial.

They are

demanded from three sides: as teachers for primary schools, as employees in other public
and private sector activities, and as inputs (students) to the university system.
allocations imply a different development of the earnings structure.

Different

Suppose, for example,

that there is a massive push to enlarge primary education with a view to early achievement
of universal lH2i·3.cy. A high proportion of secondary graduates is ploughed back into
primary teaching by squeezing the members entering other employments and going on to
university.

The consequence may be a rise in relative earnings of secondary and university

gr~duates, possibly accompanied by a decline in relative earnings of primary graduates.
__ ;. Suppose, on the other hand, that without much enlargement of secondary education
the proportion going on to universities is increased sharply.

This will again raise the

earnings premium for secondary graduates, since it reduces the supply available for
immediate employment.

But if the rise in university outputs outpaces the rise of demand

at that level, the relative earnings of university graduates will fall.

Thus it is qnHe

possible that differentials for some educational levels may be widening while others are
declining.
A further complication is that university education comprises numerous specialties.
Depending on training capacity for each specialty relative to demand movements, the prices
of different skills may move in different directions.

Relative earnings of engineers may rise

while those of philosophers fall.
These complex issues cannot be pursued here, but several things should be clear.
First, future requirements for different levels of educated manpower cannot be calculated

-28independen tly of market prices.

Second, strategy should be guided, not by the present

structure of relative earnings, but by the structure as it may appear ten or twenty years
hence, on the basis of explicit assumption s about demand elasticities and demand shifts.
Third, the actual move".'l1ent of earnings for different levels of educated manpower will be
heavily influenced by educationa l decisions.

Earnings structure, manpower allocation,

and educationa l expansion are aspects of a single interdepend ent problem.
VI.

Some Implication s for Policy and Research

It is not the purpose of this paper to explore wage policy.

-we

may note, however,

several policy issues which stand out clearly from the discussion.
(1) What is the primary function of the earnings structure in early economic growth?
Tii.is structure serves a variety of purposes.
labor, and within the working population.

It distributes income between capital and

It provides an indicator of relative skill

scarcitie·

~t influences the allocation of labor to industries, occupation s, and regions.

It affects

;kers' effort and productivity . Vvhich of these functions should be given

heaviest weight in judging whether a particular earnings structure is optimal?
(2) At what rate should real income per farm household increase over time?

This is

mainly a matter which concerns the agricultura l sector; but it also influences rural-urban
migration and the earnings level in traditional urban activities.
(3) Given thafthere will be considerab le underemplo yment of labor during the early
decades of developmen t, what is the best distribution of
"t.::•wn anci 1,.,(,:..i.::tr:r?

(4) Hr-•"
t~ ...:·~·i

1-Jr

Should rurnl-:.:.:-,._:-

t1-_;~

11

nder-emplo yment between

.... _..-..:.1:wn L~ discouraged , and if so by what means?

s~,..;·..ild wages of low-.sldHed wo!"kers tr. the modern sector be permitted

above earnings in agriculture and other traditional activities? It may. well be

impossible to avoid undesirably wide differential s; but it is still worthwhile
wage behavior would be optimal if it.: could be achieved.

~b

define what

-29(5) What is the optimal size of the educational budget, and the ;optimal allocation

of this budget among levels of education and specialized trainil)g courses? This is basic
ally a problem in manpower economics, involving relative earnings as well as physical
manpower flows?
(6) To what extent can large market differentials be eroded by progressive income

taxation? Can one assume that, the higher the wage or salary level. the larger the rental
element which can be recaptured without affecting supply? Can one assume also that the
groups involved will not seek to restore their post-tax position by a further widening of
pre-tax differentials?
It should be clear also that no LDC, even if it could define objectives and had
effective policy instruments. presently has enough knowledge to devise optimal policies.
The following may be suggested as high-priority research problems for any developing
country:
i.

Measurement of the main dimensions of earnings structure, and of how it has

changed over time.

This will usually require major improvements in the statistic_s on wages

and income.
ii.

Farmers I production and consumption responses to increases in real household

income.
iii. The volume: incidence, and determinants of rural-urban migration.
iv.

The rr1tie-

.::;.;-,L~ .ao1>rc2;,:,

e;; prc--iuctivity increase i_n the modern sector, including

·J,e roli.:: of wages and the implications for employment.

v.
vi.

Elasticity of demand for labor in modern employment. private and public.
.
.
The interaction between earnings differenti ?J 3 for "hig'.,-1evei manpower" and the

structure of the education?.) s:/stei,;.
vii. Projeciic:--. ...,;: supplies> requirements, and prospective earnings in occupations
requtri w• ,:;;..tended education.
viii. Optimal educational strategy, viewed in the light of such projections.

